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Abstract. In his eleventh century dialogue De Casu Diaboli, Anselm seeks to 
avoid the problem of evil for theodicy and explain the fall of Satan as attributable 
to Satan’s own self-creating wrongful will. It is something, as such, for which 
God as Satan’s divine Creator cannot be held causally or morally responsible. 
The distinctions on which Anselm relies presuppose an interesting metaphysics 
of nonbeing, and of the nonbeing of evil in particular as a privation of good, 
worthy of critical philosophical investigation in its own right. Anselm’s concept 
of nonbeing does not resolve the philosophical problem of evil implied by Satan’s 
fall from grace, but is shown perhaps more unexpectedly to enable Anselm’s 
proof for the inconceivable nonexistence of God as the greatest conceivable 
intended object of thought to avoid Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason objection to 
the general category of ‘ontological’ arguments.
I. ANSelm’S CoNCePT oF eVIl
Anselm of Canterbury, in his dialogue De Casu Diaboli (‘on the Devil’s 
Fall’), maintains that evil is only a privation of good, and that God as the 
source exclusively of being or that which exists cannot be responsible in 
any sense for privations. Hence, also, God cannot be responsible for the 
existence of evil. The concept of privation or the nonbeing or nonexistence 
of things is thereby elevated to a  place of explanatory importance in 
Anselm’s metaphysics, as a consequence of his theological examination of 
the problem of evil and the fall of Satan.1
Anselm’s understanding of nonbeing is worth examining in detail, 
not only as it appears in his Three Philosophical Dialogues, but also in 
1 references to and translations of De Casu Diaboli are from the Hopkins and 
richardson edition of Anselm (1967).
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the Proslogion. Anselm’s famous ‘ontological’ proof for the existence of 
God, as Immanuel Kant later styled it, can best be explained against the 
background of his concept of privation and nonbeing, and the question 
of whether that than which nothing greater is conceivable can finally 
partake of nonbeing.
Kant’s objection to Anselm’s argument in his (1781/1787) Critique 
of Pure Reason similarly depends on the assumption that an intended 
object than which nothing greater is conceivable establishes at most only 
the existence of a certain concept of God. Kant denies Anselm’s attempt 
to prove that God is an actually existent entity, notwithstanding our 
possessing an idea of something whose concept is supposed to imply 
its existence. Kant’s criticism presupposes the possibility of there being 
genuine existent concepts to which nothing existent corresponds outside 
the mind. If Anselm’s metaphysics of nonbeing is correctly interpreted, 
then the conventional Kantian complaint fails to demonstrate a deductive 
invalidity in Anselm’s reasoning.2
II. All AND oNlY beING oF THe GooD From GoD
Anselm does not set out in De Casu Diaboli with the explicit purpose of 
articulating a metaphysics of nonbeing. Anselm addresses problems in 
philosophical theology by arguing that God confers all and only good 
things on human beings and righteous and wayward angels alike. The 
evil we suffer, according to Anselm, following a precept of Augustine, is 
never anything positive, and hence ultimately nothing whatsoever.3
In the process of demonstrating that God is not the source of evil 
in the world, Anselm is driven by default toward the basic principles of 
a metaphysics of nonbeing. It is the direction his thoughts most naturally 
incline him to develop, given his interest in answering the problem of evil 
as he does. The fact, moreover, that Anselm’s metaphysics of nonbeing 
arises out of necessity actually strengthens his position and sustains its 
independent interest, despite appearing in the service of a  cluster of 
religious and metaphysical assumptions that sceptics need not accept.
What is remarkable about Anselm’s work in philosophy is his astute 
drawing of important distinctions in observing subtle linguistic nuances 
of more general philosophical application. Despite his medieval frame 
2 See below note 23.
3 Augustine (2010), vol. 22. De Natura Boni Contra Manichaeos [c. 405].
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of reference, Anselm’s thought in this connection looks remarkably 
modern and even contemporary, when he is read purely in appreciation 
of the logical structure of his philosophical inferences. The dialogues 
represent an exercise of considerable philosophical ingenuity within the 
constraints of holy writ in support of Christian dogma.
Nowhere are these features of Anselm’s philosophical abilities more 
conspicuously in evidence than in De Casu Diaboli, written by Anselm 
sometime between 1085-1090. Jasper Hopkins and Herbert richardson, 
in their edition and english translation of Anselm’s dialogues under the 
title, Truth, Freedom, and Evil: Three Philosophical Dialogues, appear to 
agree with this assessment when they write, in their insightful ‘editors’ 
Introduction’: ‘of the three dialogues, De Casu Diaboli is the most lucid, 
its argument the most consistent, its movement the most organized.’4 
We turn to this work for insight into Anselm’s implicit metaphysics 
of nonbeing as a key to his efforts to solve the problem of evil and as 
reinforcing his conceivability argument for the existence of God.
III. DImeNSIoNS oF ANSelm’S PHIloSoPHICAl DIAloGue
Anselm’s De Casu Diaboli, like his dialogues De Veritate (‘on Truth’) 
and De Libertate Arbitrii (‘on Freedom of Choice’), takes place between 
a Teacher and a Student. The dynamic is significant, because the dialectic is 
not presented as a discussion among equals, but as reflecting the Teacher’s 
attitude of superior wisdom in relation to the Student. The philosophical 
conversations in Anselm are different in this respect, despite the obvious 
hero of the works, from Plato’s dialogues, George berkeley’s (1713) Three 
Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous, and even, where the principal 
triumphant voice is more difficult to identify, David Hume’s (1779) 
Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. The master-disciple gradient 
in philosophical exchange in Anselm’s dialogues is not unique, but 
found, for example, among other especially medieval sources, notably 
in boethius’s (c. 524) Consolatio Philosophiae, where lady Philosophy 
does not debate with the prisoner, but imparts her comforting wisdom 
ex cathedra. The difference might point toward a more general trend in 
medieval religious philosophy, wherein questions are encouraged and 
doubts entertained, but are always answered from a higher standpoint of 
epistemic and moral authority.
4 Hopkins and richardson, ‘editors’ Introduction’, in Anselm (1967), p. 44.
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Again, like Anselm’s other dialogues, De Casu Diaboli begins with 
a quotation from scripture. Anselm, in this case, cites 1 Corinthians 4:7:
That it is even said to the angels, ‘What do you have that you have not 
received?’ And from God comes nothing except goodness and being; 
and every good is a being, and every being a good.5
Anselm’s choice of opening biblical verse is noteworthy in two ways. 
First, it is interesting to see that negation, nothing, and nonbeing are 
emphasized in the thematic citation before the dialogue even gets 
under way. The question posed is whether the angels have anything 
that they have not received, and we are told that nothing comes from 
God except goodness identified with being. Second, it is important to 
notice that Anselm’s solution to the problem of evil is already prefigured 
in the passage from 1 Corinthians. The dialogue serves ultimately as 
a commentary on the gospel of Paul, and only needs to be spelled out 
more completely in order to exhibit its full implications for the problem 
of evil. If God creates only goodness identified with being, and evil as 
lack or deprivation is nothing or nonbeing, then evil, nugatory at best or 
at worst, cannot come from God.
Admittedly, this reply does not yet answer the second-tier problem 
of why God appears not to prevent evil from being visited upon the 
world from other sources. To permit evil to occur, or to stand by without 
preventing its occurrence, even without sanction, when it is putatively 
within God’s power to do so, leaves more virulent formulations of the 
standard problem of evil untouched. This is precisely the version of the 
objection discussed at length by the early Church father, lucius Caecilius 
Firmianus lactantius, in The Wrath of God (De Ira Dei, c. 311-312), 
a  source with which Anselm could have been familiar, since it was 
written, even if not widely circulated, already in the fourth century.6
5 Anselm (1967), p. 147.
6 Voltaire in his Dictionnaire philosophique cites a  classic form of the problem of 
evil directed against the existence of God, dialectically considered by lucius Caecilius 
Firmianus lactantius in his (318) manuscript, De Ira Dei (The Wrath of God), available 
to Voltaire in a number of editions, beginning with a Swedish collection of the Lactantius 
Opera omnia in 1465. Voltaire (1962) writes: ‘... I must quote lactantius, Church Father, 
who in chapter 13 of The Wrath of God has epicurus say this: “either God wishes to 
expunge the evil from this world and cannot; or he can and does not wish to; or he 
neither can nor wishes to; or finally he wishes to and can. If he wishes to and cannot, 
that is impotence, which is contrary to the nature of God; if he can and does not wish 
to, that is wickedness, and that is no less contrary to his nature; if he neither wishes to nor 
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The argument itself, in a variety of forms, was in any case common coin 
in philosophical theology by Anselm’s time. Versions of the argument are 
taken up later, among other sceptical writings, most conspicuously by 
Voltaire’s Dictionnaire philosophique and Hume’s Dialogues, emphasizing 
the conflict between God’s supposed omniscience, omnipotence, and 
perfect benevolence, with the existence in the world of natural evil 
(Hume) or physical evil (mal physique, in the words of Voltaire).7 In reply 
to Anselm and Paul, we might ask if there is evil that does not derive 
from God, whether God does not know about it, is unable to prevent it, 
or that God knows about and could forestall, but chooses not to prevent. 
If the answer to any of these questions is yes, and if only a  negative 
answer mitigates the logical conflict that otherwise results from the joint 
affirmation of these propositions, then the existence and presumptive 
perfect nature of God remains logically incompatible with the existence 
of natural evil, even if God is not its source.
This pedestrian objection is anticipated early in Anselm’s dialogue. 
Already in Chapter I, the Teacher explains to the Student: ‘For since 
there are only two states of being, one which has created and the other 
which has been created, it is evident that nothing can exist, except the 
Creator and his creations.’8 If this proposition is true, then it follows that, 
despite appearances, evil as literally nothing does not exist. There exists, 
in that event, only the Creator and whatever the Creator creates. Since 
evil is always the privation of good, and since privation as the absence 
or lack of something is not something created, evil simply has no being. 
logically, then, evil does not and cannot exist, as long as the world is 
something that has been created. If, finally, there is no such thing as evil, 
then there is no basis in evil for challenging the existence or attributes of 
God as divine Creator.
can, that is wickedness and impotence at the same time; if he wishes to and can (which 
is the only one among these choices appropriate to God), where does the evil in this 
world come from?”’ (p. 117) Voltaire seems to relish quoting an august theologian on 
the problem of evil, particularly as lactantius’s solution is so unsatisfying, maintaining 
that ‘God wishes evil, but has given us the wisdom with which to choose the good’ 
(pp. 117-118). Voltaire comments not only on lactantius’s confused logic and concept of 
God as something less than perfectly benevolent, but also on the unintentional humour 
in delegating human wisdom to overcome evil.
7 See Hume (1947), Part 11, on the distinction between moral and natural evil. 
Voltaire in (1993) distinguishes between physical and moral evil (p. 96): ‘du mal moral 
et du mal physique’.
8 Anselm (1967), p. 147.
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The stubborn problem that this kind of solution does not immediately 
resolve is accounting for the appearance of evil that seems so prevalent 
a feature of the real world, despite all rational inference to the contrary. 
Nor can it suffice blithely to invoke the appearance-reality distinction 
here, despite acknowledging the chain of philosophical debt that extends 
historically backward from Anselm to Augustine, from Augustine to 
Plato, and from Plato to the pre-Socratic Parmenides. These doctrinal 
lineages do not absolve Anselm of the need to provide a better answer 
to the remaining problem of explaining the manifest appearance of 
evil merely by arguing that evil cannot be real, cannot exist, and that 
therefore whatever we consider to be evil must somehow be apparent 
rather than existent. The pain and sorrow and other natural evils that 
seem to prevail in this vale of tears, the sufferings and woes as they are 
experienced at least by the sufferer, appear to be every bit as real as the 
good and harmonious things that we also experience in God’s world. 
They are moments of appearance in the world of or as appearance, and 
the problem of evil is fully recoverable under the appearance-reality 
distinction as the challenge of understanding how such imperfect 
appearances can occur so conspicuously in a world that is supposed to 
be the production of a perfect Creator.
IV. SATAN’S FAll From GrACe
one of the dialogue’s main purposes, as the title indicates, is to account 
for the fall of Satan, and to do so in such a way that God is left blameless 
in whatever Satan does to bring about his own descent from grace. There 
is a risk of God’s being implicated in Satan’s plunge, if God is truthfully 
credited with Satan’s wrongdoing, interpreted by the Teacher and Student 
in Anselm’s dialogue as a lack of perseverance in the ability to exercise 
the purely good will that Satan originally receives from God.9
Satan, as chief among the evil angels, would appear to lack 
perseverance in the good, because, as the Student in Anselm’s dialogue 
expresses it, God did not give Satan a properly-directed will. If Satan had 
9 A tradition in popular religion that has sometimes been adapted for philosophical 
purposes tries to relate natural evil to the moral evil of distant ancestors (see inter alia 
Plantinga (1974)). The proposal is impeded when we reflect that moral evil is the result 
of natural dispositions in the exercise of decision and will for which the Creator of the 
universe is also presumably in some sense causally and morally responsible. Why were 
human beings so created as to sometimes choose moral evil?
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only possessed adequate perseverance, a good thing, which God might 
have bestowed upon instead of withholding from Satan, then Satan 
would never have fallen. The Teacher immediately and quite reasonably 
replies that not receiving something is not always the result of its not 
being given. God gives Satan both the ability and the will to receive God’s 
further gift of perseverance, but Satan resists God’s offering, and does 
not persevere in willing to receive God’s supplementary sustaining gifts. 
Satan in exercising free choice does not will the necessary perseverance 
God offers to resist entertaining a forbidden desire. God did not succeed 
in giving Satan a persevering will only because Satan refused and would 
not receive it from God. As Anselm’s Teacher explains to the Student: 
‘When the will deserted [the] uprightness, it lost something noble, 
and it received nothing in place of it except the privation of it. And 
this privation, which we call injustice, has no being.’10 even so, we are 
naturally left to wonder how God, as a  perfect being, Satan’s Creator, 
on the assumption that Satan exists, could try and fail to endow Satan 
with the perseverance Satan would have needed to persist in resisting 
his wilful fall.
V. eVIl AS NoTHING AND THe meTAPHYSICS oF NoNbeING
The discussion in Anselm’s dialogue now turns philosophically to the 
problem of what is meant by the term ‘nothing’. It is supposed to signify 
literally nothing whatever, or nonbeing; yet it accepts qualifications in 
predicate attributions. Nothing seems paradoxically to be something 
after all, a  subject capable of having properties. We can meaningfully 
think and say things about nothing, suggesting that it does after all have 
at least some type of signification. Anselm’s Student accordingly asks:
... if people are right in saying that what is called nothing really is nothing 
and never is something, then what else could follow except that the word 
‘nothing’ simply means nothing, i.e., it does not signify anything at all. So 
we come to this problem, how can the word ‘nothing’ signify not nothing, 
but something; and how can it signify not something, but nothing.11
The problem in a  sense is the same as that addressed by Socrates in 
Plato’s dialogues the Parmenides and Sophist, where Plato concludes that 
nonbeing in some sense ‘is’ in order to have the property of nonbeing. 
10 Anselm (1967), p. 162.
11 Ibid., p. 164.
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Anselm’s Teacher in the dialogue responds rather differently, introducing 
an innovation that does not seem to have occurred to Plato, distinguishing 
between two different senses of ‘signifying nothing’.
Teacher disambiguates one meaning of the phrase as implying 
something removed, leaving literally nothing behind, but still referring 
to what had existed; and another as implying something determined, 
ascribing a definite positive property to a thing, from which signifying 
nothing seems altogether precluded. In one sense of ‘signify’, ‘nothing’ 
signifies nothing; while in another, attenuated, sense, ‘nothing’ can be 
said to signify the sorts of things of which the Student’s objection takes 
notice. The Teacher adds: ‘So this word “not-something” ... in some sense 
signifies something [that which is missing or has been removed]. For it 
signifies by removing and it does not signify by determining.’12 Teacher 
now continues:
For this same reason, the name ‘nothing’, which negates whatever is 
something, signifies something rather than nothing by its removing, and 
it signifies nothing rather than something by its determining. For it is not 
necessary that nothing be something simply because its name somehow 
signifies something; rather, nothing must be nothing, because the word 
‘nothing’ signifies something only in the sense we’ve mentioned. So in 
this way, it is not repugnant to think that evil is nothing or that the name 
‘evil’ is significative; for this name is determinative of no thing when it 
signifies the negation of something.13
Anselm’s answer to the problem of making sense of the phrase that 
‘nothing exists’ or that ‘something does not exist’ is rather different than 
Plato’s. Anselm cuts the Gordian knot by insisting upon a  distinction 
according to which the word ‘nothing’ signifies in a  peculiar sense 
only that which we say does not exist, leaving ‘signifies’ in its ordinary 
meaning for ordinary names other than ‘nothing’, that genuinely refer to 
objects conceivably standing as the bearers of properties. Teacher further 
illustrates the point by invoking a comparison between the terms ‘nothing’ 
and ‘evil’ with ‘blindness’ as a lack, signifying nothing, the not having of 
something (sight) or not-something, its predicative complement:
Therefore, in this way, ‘evil’ and ‘nothing’ signify something; and what 
they signify is something not according to fact, but according to the form 
of speaking. For ‘nothing’ only signifies not-something, or the absence of 
12 Anselm’s original latin term is constitutio.
13 Anselm (1967), p. 166.
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whatever is something. And evil is nothing else except not-good, or the 
absence of good where good should be, or where it is useful for it to be. 
but what is nothing other than the absence of that which is something 
is certainly not something. So evil truly is nothing, and nothing is not.14
In time-honoured polemical fashion, Anselm’s Teacher further casts 
aspersions on colloquial terminological misapplications of a vocabulary 
about God’s creation of a  world in which natural evil occurs. ‘For we 
say many things improperly in our ordinary way of speaking’, Anselm’s 
Teacher remarks. ‘but when we wish to come to the heart of a matter, it 
is necessary to analyze, as far as the subject matter allows, the improper 
usage which is troubling us.’15 Such abuses of language include the kinds 
of things we sometimes say that lead us into philosophical conundrums 
about God’s existence and nature, as reflected specifically in the problem 
of evil. ‘For just as we say that God leads someone into temptation,’ 
Teacher continues, ‘when He doesn’t free him from it, so we say He gives 
an evil will by not prohibiting it when He can – especially since the ability 
to will anything at all comes only from God.’16 We may question the extent 
to which Anselm’s distinction accords with ordinary usage beyond the 
selected examples he considers. Contrary to Anselm’s implication, to say 
that an all-purpose cardboard box purchased new at a store to house any 
number of appropriate size objects contains nothing at a  certain time 
does not necessarily signify any, let alone all, of the things that might be 
placed in it, nor the absence or privation of any particular thing.
ultimately, Anselm’s imaginary Teacher argues that Satan falls by 
willing divine happiness. Satan wills to be like God in a free act of unjust 
willing for a kind of happiness that can only properly belong to God. 
Satan wills something other than he is entitled to will, and thereby brings 
about his own downfall, leading a train of other fallen angels guilty of 
the same offence away from eternal bliss. All this is pure speculation on 
Anselm’s part, needless to say, projecting a history of events in heaven 
that preserves logical consistency with God’s existence and perfection. 
The explanation, nevertheless, is driven by logical argument, without 
further appeal to authority beyond a scattering of scriptural verses taken 
as touchstones for discussion. Satan must have fallen in this way, Anselm 
concludes, since reason, as the dialogue is supposed to demonstrate, 
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid., p. 176.
16 Ibid., p. 183.
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supports no other possible inference. The metaphysics of being and 
nonbeing, something and nothing, now come under scrutiny once again 
in direct application to the problem of understanding Satan’s fall, and the 
question as to whether God had any moral responsibility in the event. 
Teacher maintains:
So when Satan turned his will to what he should not, both that willing 
and that turning were something; and yet he had this something only 
from God and by the will of God, since he could neither move his will nor 
will anything except through the permission of the one who makes all 
substantial and accidental and universal and individual natures. Insofar 
as Satan’s will and its turning, or movement, are something, they are 
good and they are from God. but insofar as his will lacks the justice that 
it shouldn’t lack, it is something evil – though not purely an evil; and 
whatever is evil is not from God but from willing, or from the moving of 
the will.17
Student is convinced, and dutifully replies:
I don’t have anything to argue against this. For indeed, I am unable to 
deny actions in general to be something, and I do not wish to deny that 
whatever has being comes from God. Nor does your argument in any 
way accuse God or excuse Satan; rather, it completely excuses God and 
accuses Satan.18
That should be the end of their discussion, although there remains one 
further topic for the interlocutors to explore.
VI. WHY THeN IS eVIl FeAreD?
As an unexpected reprise, Student, who has admitted to having had his 
difficulties satisfactorily addressed, still has a  few unanswered doubts. 
He now rejoins: ‘Although you have answered all my questions up to 
now,’ Student proceeds, ‘yet I  await your explaining what it is that we 
dread when we hear the name “evil”, and what causes things like robbery 
and lust, which injustice and evil seem to do, if evil is nothing?’19
A  reasonable question. If evil is literally nothing, then why do we 
take up attitudes toward it as though it were something real? Why do 
we consider it something to be avoided, to prepare against, or in many 
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid., p. 184.
19 Ibid., p. 193.
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instances to be suffered, if we can endure, as the plain facts testify? 
Teacher’s explanation is incomplete, Student respectfully implies, without 
a good answer to this problem. Teacher replies that we sometimes falsely 
though understandably attitudinize evil by misidentifying the absence 
of something important to our welfare as though it were something real:
but we are to think that if justice were in the will and sight in the eyes, then 
neither the robbery nor the fall into the pit would have taken place. It is as 
if we were to say, ‘The absence of a rudder drives the ship onto the rocks’, 
or ‘The absence of reins causes the horse to run wild’. In these statements 
we mean only that if a rudder or reins were present, then the winds would 
not drive the ship onto the rocks nor would the horse run wild.20
We learn that for Anselm, a cause of something must always be something 
positive, an existent thing or event, and not a mere lack or absence of 
something that permits other prevalent existent causes to bring about 
primarily unwanted occurrences, as incidents of natural evil. We cannot 
correctly say with Anselm, although we do frequently speak this way, 
that a  horse stumbles because it lacks a  shoe, or that it loses its shoe 
because the shoe lacks a nail.21 Such a constraint is hard to reconcile with 
a  more widespread appeal to true counterfactuals of just this kind as 
proof of causation. We generally expect that a causal connection obtains 
between two temporally distinct events e1 and later e2 when it is known 
on independent grounds that if e1 had not occurred, then e2 would 
not have occurred. Anselm seems to want to exclude such reasoning on 
the basis of several counterexamples, which he presumably considers 
representative of an unlimited field.
looking into Anselm’s argument, we can only evaluate his conclusions 
on the strength of the argument he presents. This methodological guide-
line follows upon a truism, since anything else would not concern but 
imaginatively go beyond Anselm’s documented inferences. unfortunately, 
Anselm’s purported counterexamples are not very convincing as true 
counterfactuals that fail to support causal connections. The presence of 
a rudder by itself would not prevent a ship from being driven up on the 
rocks, say, in a  tsunami. Although with reins we might better control 
a horse, it is not plausible or even very probable that the mere presence 
of reins would prevent horses from being driven wild by other causes. 
20 Ibid., pp. 193-194.
21 I develop a semantics and discuss an accompanying ontology in which lacks and 
absences can reasonably be construed as causes in Jacquette (2010).
38 DAle JACQueTTe
Anselm needs to show that there are true counterfactuals that do not 
imply a  corresponding causal connection. However, in both of his 
supposed counterexamples, we do not have true counterfactuals to begin 
with, and it comes as no surprise that the events he describes are not 
judged to be causally related.
Finally, the explanation of how Satan as the leading evil angel first 
willed unjustly reveals something interesting about Anselm’s concept of 
will and its causation. Student first asks: ‘Why, then, did he [Satan] will?’ 
To which Teacher answers: ‘only because he willed. For there was no 
other cause by which his will was in any way driven or drawn; but his will 
was both its own efficient cause and its own effect – if such a thing can 
be said!’22 Will is to blame for Satan’s fall, or rather the fatal content and 
intentionality of a particular moment in the exercise of will. We might 
accordingly conclude that when they are able to do so, spirits command 
nothing more powerful than their own sovereign wills. Anselm’s Teacher 
concludes that Satan wrongfully wills to have a wrongful will. The event 
does not take place through Satan’s having been created with a corrupt 
will, for that would indict God’s blame in Satan’s fall. Satan’s simultaneous 
wrongful willing of a wrongful will is entirely self-creating, and hence 
something for which only Satan is causally and morally responsible.
If such a thing can be said, is exactly what alert philosophical critics 
should question. We must ask Anselm’s Teacher how a perfect God could 
have created a spirit like Satan with the foreknowable propensity to self-
create what in God’s own righteous judgment is destined to be deemed 
a wrongful will. We are driven again to conclude that will is perhaps the 
most powerful and potentially dangerous force in the universe. Without 
trying to make better sense of Satan’s wilful self-creating act of moral evil, 
and on Anselm’s closing ambivalent note, we turn next to an unexpected 
application of Anselm’s discussion of being and nothingness.
VII. CATeGorIeS oF beING AND THe ‘oNToloGICAl’ ArGumeNT
Anselm’s argument for the existence of God, giving faith independent 
rational support, is too well known to require detailed exposition. 
Anselm presents the so-called second ontological proof in Proslogion III:
For there can be thought to exist something whose non-existence is 
inconceivable; and this thing is greater than anything whose non-existence 
22 Anselm (1967), p. 195.
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is conceivable. Therefore, if that than which a greater cannot be thought 
could be thought not to exist, then that than which a  greater cannot 
be thought would not be that than which a  greater cannot be thought 
– a  contradiction. Hence, something than which a  greater cannot  be 
thought exists so truly that it cannot even be thought not to exist. And 
You are this being, o lord our God. Therefore, lord my God, You exist so 
truly that You cannot even be thought not to exist.23
The inference maintains that God, defined as that than which none 
greater is conceivable, must exist. otherwise, the argument implies, 
it would be possible to conceive of a  being greater than God; which, 
namely, would be a being with all of God’s properties that additionally 
also exists. An existent God is something at least conceivably greater 
than a nonexistent God.
Kant’s objection to Anselm’s argument is also well known, despite 
being frequently misinterpreted. The idea is that existence cannot be 
included among an object’s object-individuating, identity-determining, 
or identity-constituting constitutive properties, as Anselm’s proof is 
sometimes alleged to require. For otherwise we could not intelligibly 
affirm or deny that the very same identical object exists. Kant illustrates 
the limitation with the example of 100 gold Thalers, referring to 
individuating, identity-determining or identity-constituting constitutive 
properties excluding their existence or nonexistence as predicates.24 
Kant’s criticism crucially depends on the assumption that the existence 
and nonexistence of God marks a  dichotomy of possible ontic states 
that are just like or precisely parallel to those of any other object. What 
we discover in Anselm’s discussion of nonbeing in De Casu Diaboli 
effectively blunts the force of Kant’s objection, whether or not Anselm’s 
Proslogion inference is rightly classified as an ‘ontological’ argument in 
the sense presupposed by Kant’s criticism.
The question is whether, for Anselm, trying to conceive of God as 
not existing, having all of God’s characteristic properties plus nonbeing, 
is properly described as an effort to think of nonbeing as a  predicate 
23 Anselm (1974), I, p. 94. Anselm writes (1945-1951), I, pp. 102-103: ‘Nam potest 
cogitari esse aliquid, quod non possit cogitari non esse; quod maius est quam quod non esse 
cogitari potest. Quare si id quo maius nequit cogitari, potest cogitari non esse: id ipsum quo 
maius cogitari nequit, non est id quo maius cogitari nequit; quod convenire non potest. Sic 
ergo vere est aliquid quo maius cogitari non potest, ut nec cogitari possit non esse. Et hoc es 
tu, domine deus noster. Sic ergo vere es, domine deus meus, ut nec cogitari possis non esse.’
24 Kant (1965), ‘Ideal der reinen Vernunft’, A599/b627-A600/b628.
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in Kant’s sense, which is to say, as a  constitutive, object-individuating 
or identity-determining property. If Anselm does not propose this, 
then, however appropriately Kant’s objection might apply to similar 
formulations of ontological arguments for the existence of God, such 
as leibniz’s in his (1765) New Essays on Human Understanding, or 
Descartes’ in his (1641) Meditations on First Philosophy V, it can have no 
effect on Anselm’s Proslogion statement of a significantly different form 
of the argument.25 Anselm is reasonably understood as not regarding 
either being or nonbeing as object-individuating or identity-determining 
properties in the sense of Kant’s predicates. There is no justification for 
such an attribution to Anselm that would inexplicably contradict his 
explicit contrary commitments in De Casu Diaboli. There, as now seen, 
Anselm emphatically declares that nonbeing is nothing whatsoever, and 
hence not an identity-determining or individuating property. Anselm 
says unequivocally in discussing the nonbeing of evil that it is neither 
Creator nor any part of creation, and hence not a part of the universe 
at any time or place. It is also worth recalling that Kant, in refuting 
a  generic form of the ontological argument in the Critique, nowhere 
mentions Anselm by name, despite referring explicitly to both Descartes 
and leibniz as particular exponents of the ontological argument. We can 
only speculate as to whether Kant means his objections to include the 
significantly different inferential form of Anselm’s reasoning. It is clear 
nonetheless that Kant’s objections apply more cogently if at all, not to 
Anselm’s argument, but to Descartes’ much later version that actually 
fits Kant’s description, and to leibniz’s amendments of Descartes’ 
ontological proof.
Although Anselm’s inference is frequently but inaccurately included 
in the category of ‘ontological arguments’, as Kant later styles them, 
Anselm appears to be reasoning rather differently. Sufficient attention to 
the details and giving proper emphasis to and inquiring into the meaning 
of the differences between Anselm’s and Descartes-leibniz, reveals 
that Kant’s sense of the concept includes all and only those inferences 
to establish the existence of God that depend on the proposition that 
existence is somehow included analytically in the concept of a perfect 
being. Anselm may also believe this, but his argument does not require 
the assumption that a perfect being must also possess the perfection of 
25 See inter alia malcolm (1960); Shaffer (1962); engel (1963); Plantinga (1966); 
Schufreider (1978); brecher (1985); bencivenga (1993).
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existing. He maintains instead that God exists, because by ‘God’ we mean 
to designate the greatest thing we are capable of conceiving, and because 
we cannot conceive of the greatest conceivable thing as not existing.
Whatever the merits of the inference, Anselm’s argument does not 
explicitly assume that the property of existing belongs to the nature or 
essence of God, even as that than which nothing greater is conceivable. 
The argument on this reconstruction does not really say anything 
about God, as opposed to the word ‘God’, until the very end, and does 
not mention God’s nature or essence, or the properties attributable to 
God, but only to what we can and cannot conceive of as implied by the 
concept of being the greatest. What is great and what is not so great 
is not investigated, although we may expect to find such traditional 
monotheistic divine greatness attributes as omnipotence, omnipresence, 
omniscience, and perfect benevolence. Anselm does not mention 
these or any other properties of the greatest conceivable being in the 
context of the argument, and he seems understandably unwilling within 
or as part of an inference to ascribe any properties to an object whose 
existence the argument itself is first supposed to demonstrate. Anselm, 
for the same reason, unlike Descartes and leibniz, cannot be expected to 
maintain that existence as a constitutive identity-determining property 
is a perfection analytically included among all perfections in the nature 
or essence of a perfect being.
We may still wonder why Anselm would regard it as inconceivable 
for the greatest conceivable being not to exist, unless like Descartes and 
leibniz he includes or tries anyway to include existence analytically 
among the properties and hence part of the nature or essence of a greatest 
conceivable being. The fact that Anselm might or even would probably 
also have agreed with these propositions should not be confused with 
what he explicitly includes in or excludes from his attempted proof for the 
existence of God, or even with what he would need to include in order 
to carry his inference. The weight of evidence is entirely on what can be 
deduced from the conceivability of the greatest conceivable being as of that 
than which none greater is conceivable. Anselm believes that the greatest 
conceivable being must actually exist, because to suppose otherwise 
leaves us with the possibility of conceiving something yet greater. Why, 
however, would such a conceivable being be greater by virtue of existing 
rather than not existing, if to exist were not a property contributing at 
least to an otherwise perfect conceivable being’s greatness? Anselm 
can answer such questions easily by maintaining that in his argument 
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existence rather than nonexistence, being rather than nonbeing, does 
not need to contribute to a  conceivable being’s greatness, but only to 
whether or not when we try to conceive of such a thing we succeed in 
conceiving of what would actually be the greatest conceivable being. If we 
are conceiving only of something great in many ways, but that does not 
actually exist, then we are not yet conceiving of the greatest conceivable 
being or of a being that is as great as it would be possible for it to be.
Does this difference suffice to remove Anselm’s argument from Kant’s 
criticism of ‘ontological’ proofs like Descartes’ and leibniz’s? Why does 
Anselm regard it as inconceivable for the greatest conceivable being not 
to exist, unless, like Descartes and leibniz, he includes or tries anyway to 
include existence analytically among the properties and hence as part of 
the nature or essence of a greatest conceivable being? What else could set 
the limits on the conceivability of the greatest conceivable being, if not 
the properties essential to the greatest conceivable being’s constitutive 
identity conditions?
Anselm believes that the greatest conceivable being must actually 
exist, because to suppose otherwise leaves us with the possibility of 
conceiving something yet greater. Perhaps so, but we may doubt whether 
such a conceivable being would be greater by virtue of existing rather 
than not existing, if to exist were not a  property contributing at least 
to an otherwise perfect conceivable being’s greatness, as in Descartes 
and leibniz. Anselm can answer such questions by maintaining that 
in his argument existence contributes to the greatest conceivable 
being’s greatness without being a  constitutive or identity-determining 
property inhering in the greatest conceivable being’s nature or essence. 
The conceived-of object is one predication subject, determined by its 
nature or essence of constitutive identity-determining properties, and 
its nonsupervenient greatness or otherwise is another matter. Anselm 
argues that if we conceive of anything that does not exist, then, whatever 
else we are thinking about, we are not conceiving of the greatest 
conceivable being. If we are conceiving only of something that is great 
in many ways, but that does not actually exist, then Anselm holds we are 
not yet conceiving of the greatest conceivable being or of a being that 
would be as great as logically possible. The fact that existence contributes 
to the greatness of a greatest conceivable being by itself does not logically 
imply that existence is a constitutive or identity-determining property in 
the nature or essence of a greatest conceivable being.
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Does Anselm’s proof, so construed and independently of its merits, 
fall under Kant’s classification of ‘ontological arguments’? The question 
can be approached in at least the following two ways. We can accept 
tradition and lump Anselm’s argument together with what in Kant’s 
sense are the more explicitly ontological arguments of Descartes and 
leibniz (the latter of whom merely offers a  relatively conservative 
correction to Descartes’). or, given the content of Kant’s objection, we 
can allow that Descartes and leibniz, but not Anselm, offer ontological 
arguments in the intended sense. They assume in so many words that to 
exist is a perfection, and that God defined as having all perfections, all 
and only perfect properties, must therefore exist. We can then inquire 
as to whether or not Anselm’s proof boils down to this same kind of 
ontological argument. If we follow the first alternative, then, if Anselm’s 
argument is not subject to Kant’s criticism, and, in light of the exception, 
Kant does not refute all ontological arguments. If we opt for the second, 
then, again, if, as we shall show in either case, Anselm’s argument is 
not subject to Kant’s criticism, then Kant’s objection may be decisive 
with respect to all semantic and metaphysically-grounded ontological 
arguments like Descartes-leibniz, but they do not refute Anselm’s 
psychological-possibilities-grounded conceivability argument.
evil is nothing, according to Anselm, and is therefore no part of God’s 
causal or moral responsibility. Does it make sense, consequently, for 
Anselm to attribute the individuating or identity-determining property, 
or, speaking anachronistically, Kantian predicate, to evil, in saying that 
evil is nonexistent or partakes of nonbeing, that it is simply and absolutely 
nothing? Anselm in effect agrees with Kant across the centuries, 
maintaining that nonbeing, nonexistence, are not predicates, for it is 
nothing whatsoever, and as such it is incapable of qualifying any object 
in any positive way as to any of its properties, not even its categorically 
most general ontic status as nonexistent. All that is further needed to 
complete the argument is to observe that if nonbeing or nonexistence 
is not a Kantian predicate in the required sense, as Kant himself would 
also agree, then neither is being or existence. If evil were not nothing 
but a something, in the way that Anselm seems to regard the substantive 
import of these quantifiers, then, presumably, it could support such 
alternative ontic categorical properties as being or nonbeing. This is 
precisely what Anselm denies. We need only compare Anselm’s implied 
difference of attitude toward the Taj mahal with that of evil as altogether 
nothing, in order to appreciate the difference. Whereas a full size solid 
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glass Taj mahal does not happen to exist, Anselm, presumably, like Kant, 
albeit for different reasons, would not attribute nonbeing to a solid glass 
Taj mahal as one of its defining attributes. He would not consider there 
to be a Kantian predicate, object-individuating or identity-determining 
or identity-constituting property, of being a specifically nonexistent solid 
glass Taj mahal. The nonexistent full size solid glass Taj mahal is solid 
glass and a mausoleum, and hence a building of a certain sort with certain 
dimensions, among other things, but for Anselm as for Kant it does not 
have the property of nonbeing among its defining or characterizing 
properties. It is true that the object does not exist, so that the nonexistent 
object can be said to have the ontic property (not a Kantian predicate) 
of nonbeing, but this ontic property does not contribute toward making 
it the particular object it is, the (nonexistent) solid glass Taj mahal. The 
reason why a full size solid glass Taj mahal does not exist is instead just 
that, in fact, as world history has contingently unfolded, no one happens 
to have made one, nor has one occurred naturally.
We encounter, consequently, a final fundamental question: If Anselm 
does not assume that God is necessarily identified as a particular object 
by reference to God’s possessing the property of existence, how, then, 
is Anselm’s proof for the existence of God supposed to work? Seeing 
Anselm’s Proslogion in relation to De Casu Diaboli enables us to refine 
our understanding of Anselm’s conceivability argument for the existence 
of God, and reverse a centuries-old misinterpretation of the argument’s 
intent. If we begin with the assumption, made for purposes of reductio 
ad absurdum, that God does not exist, then by saying that another being 
greater than God by virtue of existing rather than not existing would 
be conceivable, we are not encouraged by anything that Anselm says to 
suppose that existence is therefore among this entity’s Kantian predicates 
or individuating or identity-determining properties.26 luckily for Anselm, 
we need make no such assumption about the essential propertyhood of 
existence in order to understand his reasoning. Indeed, as Kant argues 
eight hundred years after, it would be mistaken to do so, whether or not 
precisely this mistake is uncharitably laid at Anselm’s door.
All that is required for Anselm’s argument to make sense independently 
of the question of its deductive validity, soundness, and significance, 
is comprehending what Anselm means by saying that it is not possible 
to conceive of God as both that than which none greater is conceivable 
26 See also Jacquette (1997).
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and as not existing. It follows only that Anselm regards existence or 
being in contrast with nonexistence or nonbeing as contributing to the 
conceivability of God’s greatness, but not necessarily by making God’s 
existence into one of God’s individuating or identity-determining 
properties or Kantian predicates. An existent God is conceivably greater, 
if Anselm is right, than a  nonexistent God. The reason is not because 
existence is among God’s constitutive properties or Kantian predicates, 
contributing to God’s greatness, but simply because as we conceive of the 
two scenarios, we judge that, if we do, God’s existing is something ‘greater’ 
than God’s not existing. The argument is that we conceive of something 
greater if we conceive of God as existing than as not existing, although 
God’s identity conditions are logically independent of God’s greatness.
This saving feature of Anselm’s argument is notably not shared by 
kindred ontological proofs for the existence of God in leibniz and 
Descartes. Descartes in meditation V argues:
... when we attend to immense power of this being, we shall be unable 
to think of its existence as possible without also recognizing that it can 
exist by its own power; and we shall infer from this that this being does 
really exist and has existed from eternity, since it is quite evident by the 
natural light that what can exist by its own power always exists. So we 
shall come to understand that necessary existence is contained in the 
idea of a supremely perfect being...27
leibniz subsequently offers an important but sympathetic amendment 
to Descartes’ version of the argument, filling in what he perceived as 
a missing piece of the puzzle in the proof Descartes states, by showing 
that Descartes’ concept of God is logically possible.28 The difference 
between the ‘ontological’ arguments often mistakenly attributed on 
Kant’s authority to Anselm, on the one hand, and Descartes and leibniz, 
on the other, are seen from the standpoint of Kant’s objection to this 
method of proof. We appreciate the impact on both Descartes’ and 
leibniz’s arguments when we consider that what is essential to both is 
Descartes’ conclusion that existence is necessarily contained in the idea of 
a supremely perfect being, against which Kant’s objection is more plainly 
targeted. Anselm does not talk like this, but speaks instead of what we 
logically can and cannot conceive concerning the idea of a  greatest 
27 Descartes (1984), vol. 2, p. 45. See also Crocker (1976); beyssade (1992); Kenny 
(1997); Abbruzzese (2007).
28 leibniz (1981), Chapter 10, p. 438.
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conceivable being, a ‘supremely perfect being’ in Descartes’ terminology, 
which is supposedly to be none other than God.
An existent Anselmian God is not the same thing as a nonexistent 
Anselmian God. Their ontic properties are manifestly different, just as an 
existent solid glass Taj mahal is not the same thing as a nonexistent solid 
glass Taj mahal. Anselm’s argument does not compel us to conceive of 
an existent God as constituted in part by the property of existing, thereby 
precluding the conceivability of a  nonexistent God. Anselm’s as yet 
unrefuted conceivability argument equally compels us in another way 
and for different reasons also to regard a  nonexistent God or greatest 
conceivable being as impossible in the sense of being inconceivable. 
existence, in Kant’s distinction, is a  property of existent things, but it 
is not a  constitutive identity-determining property, not a  predicate. 
Anselm has no need to disagree with any of this, nor does his text 
encourage dissent from Kant’s main point. For Anselm it is the same 
independently identity-conditioned God that is conceived of as greater 
if conceived as existing rather than as not existing, from which Anselm 
concludes that God defined as the greatest conceivable being logically 
must exist. There is a crucial difference between Anselm’s conceivability 
argument and leibniz’s or Descartes’ ‘ontological’ ‘proofs’, that Kant’s 
objection neither glosses over nor obscures, but leaves unmentioned 
as a  possible alternative route to the rational demonstration of God’s 
necessary existence. It is a vital distinction that Anselm’s discussion of 
the metaphysics of nonbeing in De Casu Diaboli helps to reinforce, and 
enables us more clearly to appreciate.
The essential difference between Anselm’s conceivability argument 
and the Kantian ‘ontological proofs’ of Descartes and leibniz is that 
for Anselm existence is not part of God’s identity as an entity, on the 
divine object side of things, but belongs exclusively instead to God’s 
greatness and to the concept of God as that than which none greater is 
conceivable.29
29 A version of the essay under this title was presented at the International Anselm 
Conference, university of Kent at Canterbury, england, 22-25 April 2009. I am grateful 
to Arjo Vanderjagt for insightful comments.
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